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Abstract
The West Bend Memorial Library controversy is an instructive ex-
ample of how the framing assumptions—the ground—of public 
space have come under attack not only from the re-evaluation of 
social legitimacy heralded and embodied by an economics-based 
paradigm but equally from those who stand in opposition to what 
Habermas characterizes as the bourgeoisie-established criterion of 
political legitimacy: that is to say, enlightenment rationality. While 
the grassroots movement in support of the public library ethos stood 
with the nineteenth century’s enlightenment rationality, the group 
promoting censorship of LGBTQ-themed materials stood firmly in 
the more socially relevant, refeudalized, public sphere of the early 
twenty-first century—one in which the legitimating function of ratio-
nal discourse has been eroded by opinion and manipulative publicity. 
This explains why the grassroots effort was itself largely irrelevant 
to the outcome of events. The library’s autonomy was kept in place 
not by social or political forces (both subject to refeudalization) but 
by the law. The grassroots movement to support the library thus 
illuminates the cracks, or fault lines, resulting from a change in 
how “public space” (and, thus, public institutions) have come to be 
understood during the last one hundred years, and, specifically, in 
the resulting change in modes of sanctioned discourse: specifically, 
from rational public debate to manipulative publicity. 
On February 15th, 2009, a group of conservative religious activists, spear-
headed by Ginny and Jim Maziarka, filed a complaint about links to gay-
themed literature on the West Bend Memorial Library’s website. This origi-
nal complaint, slipped into the library’s overnight book drop, mutated over 
time to include a list of “objectionable” books as the complaint and review 
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process moved closer to the culminating library board meeting that June. 
In the meantime, this group mounted a well-organized publicity campaign 
to convince the West Bend city council to remove uncooperative library 
board members from office. While their campaign to remove “objection-
able” materials from the library disintegrated on contact with the U.S. 
Constitution, their campaign to remove library board members who op-
posed them was, in fact, a success.
 The Maziarkas and their fellow procensorship advocates were met by 
a vigorous grassroots response. That response—a story I was privileged 
to take part in—carries all the hallmarks of a standard, almost clichéd, 
heroic narrative. Like similar heroic narratives, it starts this way: “a plucky 
band of local citizens rushes to defend their local library from the forces 
of censorship, superstition, and ignorance.” Our band of local citizens sat-
isfied all three conditions. First, we were plucky: members included ’60s-
era-activist/grandparents, stay-at-home moms, precocious high school 
students, and a professional cake decorator. Secondly, we did everything 
people rushing to defend Enlightenment values are supposed to do: meet-
ings were held; Maria Hanrahan, one of the West Bend Activists for Free 
Speech later recognized by the ACLU for her role in this effort, started 
a website and collected signatures; local blog forums filled up with con-
stitutionally rigorous critiques of the procensorship position; I wrote a 
couple of Swiftean columns for the local newspaper; we showed up, ar-
guments ready, and prepared for battle at the library board meeting; we 
rabble-roused; we received national and international press coverage; and 
support arrived, like the cavalry, from the ACLU, the ALA, and the Ameri-
can Publishers Association. Finally, our opponents were, indeed, almost 
entirely vocal, right-wing, ideologically driven fundamentalist Christians 
who seemed to believe that tolerating GLBTQ-themed literature in the 
library—like teaching evolution in the public schools—posed a threat to 
the future of America. In the end, no books were removed from the li-
brary. Censorship was defeated. Victory was ours. Right?
 On the surface, we did everything right. On the surface, we stood up 
for the U.S. Constitution. On the surface, we stood up to a well-organized 
and popular effort by religiously motivated conservative challengers to im-
pose censorship on the West Bend Memorial Library. On reflection, two 
wrinkles appear that indicate an underlying tension between the law and 
the willingness of our adversaries and their supporters on the West Bend 
city council to pay attention either to our arguments (grounded on that 




board from retribution by the West Bend Common Council.
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 But, one might object, didn’t your actions protect the library? Here’s the 
first wrinkle: technically, the U.S. Constitution and two hundred years of 
case law guaranteed the integrity of the library as a public institution and 
would have done so whether we organized or not. The single effect our 
action had was to drag this controversy into the public sphere, to expose it 
to merciless daylight in the national, and then international, press. Had we 
done nothing, it is possible the “objectionable materials” would have been 
removed and the entire matter hushed up, but even then any such actions 
would have still been illegal. Legalities aside, our actions satisfied the condi-
tions of the traditional, American public sphere: we made it public, the law 
took over, but, technically, it was the law that protected those books, not us.
Were our actions wasted, then? Wrinkle number two suggests that the 
effects of our actions were, indeed, limited, for, while the Constitution 
protected the library, it did not protect the Library Board members who 
opposed the censorship effort. Any board member who was up for re- 
appointment was removed from the board by a conservative majority on 
the West Bend city council, which yielded, in some cases enthusiastically, 
to the well-organized campaign of the procensorship lobby. Our argu-
ments, our rational and constitutionally warranted position in this debate, 
in this sense, again had no effect on the outcome.
It is safe to say that, for most of us, unremitting frustration character-
ized the whole experience. It is not surprising, perhaps, that zealously pro-
censorship religious conservatives would ignore our arguments; it is not 
even surprising that conservative members of the West Bend Common 
Council might ignore our protests. What remains surprising was the Com-
mon Council’s casual indifference to United States Supreme Court deci-
sions governing this question—decisions readily available to anyone with 
ten minutes of free time and access to Google. The Common Council did 
not seem any more interested in constitutional case law than the Maziar-
kas were in the library’s grievance and complaint procedures (complaint 
procedures to which they exhibited an ongoing and—we thought—de-
liberate indifference). Neither the Council nor the Maziarkas ever sug-
gested that they had a more rational interpretation of how the Constitution 
applies to public libraries. They simply seemed to believe their personal 
opinions mattered more. 
How could this be?
Explaining the actions of the West Bend Common Council demon-
strates a kind of conceptual dissonance that points toward an explanation 
somewhere in their worldview rather than in their immediate, superficial, 
statements. They had allowed a well-organized and manipulative public 
outcry to sway them from their sworn, legal duty, and—philosophically 
speaking—this is the most interesting and revealing point. It raises ques-
tions about social, not merely individual, contexts and about the ground-
ing assumptions on which the Common Council was operating.
 grassroots and habermas/peterson 753
The West Bend Memorial Library controversy, even as it unfolded, 
became a useful case study in many of my courses at the University of 
Wisconsin’s Washington County campus. This case powerfully illustrates 
Plato’s critique of democracy at the end of the Republic, it picks up pieces 
of Hobbes and Locke (in particular, social covenants and the responsi-
bilities these carry for citizens), and rather beautifully instantiates Hegel’s 
explication of the dialectical relations between civil society and the state. 
Even for Peircean semiotics, this case presents a clear illustration of how 
ideologues are often stuck in an indexically fixed mode of discourse that 
cuts them off from the greater understanding found in symbolic represen-
tations. The West Bend case brilliantly illuminates concepts like epistemic 
closure and rhetorical framing. It was a gold mine.
As a professor, I can always use another case study to illustrate core 
ideas from the history of philosophy, but as a participant in the contro-
versy itself, understanding became a matter of urgently personal, rather 
than merely academic, interest. I needed core ideas from the history of 
philosophy to help me make sense of the case study and its sociopolitical 
context. It is one thing to dig out the gold—I needed to map the mine. 
Hegel’s discussion of civil society and the state in his Philosophy of Right1 
provides an initial and compelling interpretive framework for explaining 
the actions of the Maziarkas and the West Bend city council but, if we jump 
ahead one hundred years in the line of succession from Hegel via Marx 
and the Frankfurt School, we land on the work of Jürgen Habermas—a 
penetrating thinker who continues to offer insights into the factors con-
ditioning our current political realities. His Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere (Habermas, 1991) provides a concise, illuminating, and more 
contemporary explication of the dialectical relations found in Hegel. In a 
nutshell, as the grounding assumptions of the public sphere undergo their 
historical transformations, institutions and, indeed, modes of sanctioned 
discourse adjust accordingly. To borrow a metaphor from geology, as the 
tectonics of the public sphere were folded and faulted during the past 
three hundred years, the overlying topography—embodied in society’s in-
stitutions and framing assumptions—reflects those changes. Habermas’s 
work provides a “metaframework”2 that maps out the relationship between 
those often difficult-to-observe tectonics and the overlying, easier to spot, 
topographical details. John Buschman’s (2003 & 2005) workmanlike ap-
plication of Habermas to public libraries provides an accessible cross sec-
tion of this map. I can offer only a brief account of Habermas here, but 
an in-depth reading of his and Buschman’s work is well worth the effort.
Habermas begins by considering the role that the public sphere has 
played in grounding the legitimation of authority in a society. In brief, 
starting around three hundred years ago, the mercantile classes of Europe 
began to demand that laws, originally created by the whims of monarchs, 
be submitted to rational, public debate. This use of the public sphere 
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transformed its original function from a place where people gathered 
as an audience to acknowledge and acclaim the representations of royal 
power, into an arena for submitting royal decrees to the test of rationality. 
The legitimacy of the monarch’s decisions, in other words, came to be 
grounded not merely in his or her authority but in whether they had been 
tested by rational public debate. It was the public sphere, not the God-
Granted Right of Kings, that came to ground the legitimacy of authority—
at first royal, and then later parliamentary and congressional.
Habermas observes that this new “public” was constituted first and fore-
most by the bourgeoisie, the merchant class, which then set the criteria 
for membership: owning property and education.3 Habermas is thinking 
about the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when education was still 
the result of your economic status and not, as is generally the case today, the 
cause of your economic status (1991, p. 85). Unfortunately for the bourgeoi-
sie, a number of nonbourgeois groups were included in the “public.” Haber-
mas identifies them as “doctors, pastors, officers, professors, and ‘scholars’ 
who were at the top of the hierarchy, moving down to schoolteachers and 
scribes, and then to the ‘people’” (p. 23). The people who really mattered, 
of course, were the economically enfranchised members of the “public” (the 
bourgeoisie), not the educationally enfranchised members of the “public” 
(doctors, pastors, officers, professors, and school teachers).
The accidental members, however, participated fully in the rational de-
bates that increasingly characterized the public sphere after 1800—but 
they didn’t stop there. In a dialectically appropriate twist, the forces un-
leashed by relocating the legitimation of authority to the public sphere at 
first advantageous to the bourgeoisie now turned directly against bour-
geois interests and toward the common good.4 These doctors, pastors, pro-
fessors, and scholars did what unpropertied, but rational, people always do 
with power grounded on reason and morality instead of economics: they 
used their access to the political system to encourage democratic, rather 
than plutocratic, societies (Habermas, 1991, pp. 145, 148).
And here we arrive at the traditional, fourth-grade civics class version of 
nineteenth-century American democracy—the version in Norman Rock-
well’s paintings5—and the version embraced by those of us defending the 
West Bend library from the forces of censorship. You stand up in public, 
you speak using rational arguments, and people accept or refuse to ac-
cept your arguments on rational grounds. The structural transformation 
of the public sphere, however, like any tectonic plate, did not stop mov-
ing in the late 1800s. Habermas follows this movement forward in time. 
The economic values and modes of discourse that characterized the bour-
geoisie’s social paradigm infected the public sphere itself and carried it 
into a zone in which economic values came to replace the values of the 
Enlightenment; the critical publicity that once brought forth rational de-
bate was “supplanted by manipulative publicity” (Habermas, 1991, p. 178). 
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Publicity—once the task of making the monarch’s decisions available for 
critical debate in the public sphere (the basis for much of the democra-
tization that happened through the nineteenth century and, indeed, for 
opposing censorship in public libraries)—by the early twentieth century 
became useful “for exerting political pressure because it mobilizes a po-
tential of inarticulate readiness to assent that, if need be, can be translated 
into a plebiscitary defined acclamation” (p. 201). He succinctly summarizes 
the inevitable clash of paradigms this more recent change has created: “On 
the other hand, to the degree to which it preserves the continuity with the 
liberal constitutional state, the social-welfare state clings to the mandate of 
a political public sphere according to which the public is to set in motion 
a critical process of public communication through the very organizations 
that ‘mediatize’ it. In the constitutional reality of the social-welfare state this 
form of critical publicity is in conflict with publicity merely staged for manipulative 
end” (p. 231, emphasis added)—which brings us back to West Bend.
Buschman’s fine account identifies the key functions libraries embod-
ied under the old paradigm, functions we fought for in West Bend. Here 
are two examples: 
•	 Libraries	“act”	to	verify	(or	refute)	rational	validity	claims	in	making	
current retrospective organized resources available to check the bases of 
the thesis, law, book, article, or proposal and thus aiding and continuing 
the rational communicative process of critique and argumentation.
•	 Libraries	contain	within	their	collections	the	potential for rational critique 
and individual/community self-realization, thus grounding the commu-
nicative process and the possibility to reestablish democratic processes. 
(Buschman, 2003, pp. 46–47)
These functions belong to libraries under the aegis of the earlier, 
nineteenth-century version of the public sphere. Libraries, like other pub-
lic institutions, rest—literally and metaphorically—on their foundations: 
when the foundation changes, so does the basis of their legitimacy. That 
public sphere has changed; the West Bend case illustrates just how far. 
Libraries, which serviced the needs of that earlier public sphere (as reposi-
tories of fact organized to assist reasoned discussion), are now being com-
pelled to service the needs of the new—one in which consumer desire, 
rather than reasoned debate, has become the ground for the legitimation 
of authority. Thus, under this new consumer paradigm, the measurement 
of library success, of acceptable practice, becomes customer satisfaction: li-
braries are now understood to be legitimate only as “McLibraries,” as food 
courts in the shopping mall of twenty-first-century civil society, passing out 
the “instant-satisfaction, fast-food equivalent of information” (Buschman, 
2003, pp. 99, 120–121).
What is clear, certainly from the controversy over censorship of the West 
Bend Library, is that rational debate, once enshrined as the sanctioned 
756 library trends/spring 2014
mode of discourse in the public sphere, no longer carries the social capital 
required to persuade either the public at large or even their representa-
tives in local government. The public sphere that once sanctioned rational 
debate as the appropriate mode of social discourse, now sanctions only 
consumer desire and advertising-driven public assent.
Here we can begin to see the outlines of an answer to the nagging 
question of why neither the procensorship forces nor the West Bend Com-
mon Council would listen to reason: we were fighting to defend the li-
brary on grounds that no longer mattered. Worse, we were fighting to 
defend a “library” (and, now that I think about it, a “Constitution”) that 
no longer exists in the popular mind. The public space has changed from 
our optimistically civic, nineteenth-century version, into one in which the 
“subjective opining of the many,”6 rather than rational debate, is the only 
mode of public discourse that matters—and is, indeed, the new ground 
for the legitimation of authority. Just as Buschman (2005) notes: “Our 
acceding to economic models as a public philosophy results in an active 
deconstructing of the public sphere discourse that libraries represent” 
(p. 5). Our grassroots resistance used a mode of discourse that was no 
longer accessible to our religious opponents or even, one imagines, to the 
members of the West Bend Common Council. With this successful rise of 
advertising, of manipulative publicity, the public sphere has been changed 
back into a theater and the public back into an audience, just as they were 
during the seventeenth century. 
From Habermas’s point of view, that’s where we are. With the advent 
of the modern public sphere, characterized by the manipulation of public 
opinion by those who control advertising for economic ends, Habermas 
sees a return to what Hegel characterizes as a “civil society” that takes on 
feudal features, one in which rational critique “gives way before a mood of 
conformity with publicly presented persons or personifications; consent 
coincides with good will by publicity,” and, even more clearly, he notes 
how “the ‘suppliers’ display a showy pomp before customers ready to fol-
low. Publicity imitates the kind of aura proper to the personal prestige and 
supernatural authority once bestowed by the kind of publicity involved in 
representation” (Habermas, 1991, p. 195). Consumerism has become the 
public acclaim that once established royal authority and now grounds the 
legitimation of authority in our culture. Simultaneously, this change is 
continuing to dismantle those institutions that depended on the previous 
public sphere (libraries, schools, democracy) along with their sanctioned 
mode of discourse—the use of rational public debate to resolve our politi-
cal disputes.7
Finally, here’s Habermas’s explanation of our frustration: why was it so 
easy for the censorship advocates, and a majority on the West Bend Com-
mon Council, to ignore the Constitution and punish the library board 
members who put their faith in the rule of law? If Habermas is correct, 
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then today the authority of the law, whether in the form of simple library 
protocols or Constitutional rights, is no longer grounded on rational de-
bate but now rests instead on mere consumer-appropriate, advertising-
driven, popular feeling. Habermas’s interpretive frame explains both why 
and how the GLBTQ-themed material in the West Bend library came un-
der attack, and why and how the library board members who stood their 
ground in the “old” public sphere were tossed out of office by a West 
Bend Common Council that stood its ground in the “new.” We did not 
understand that our public spaces had been refeudalized, and that our 
publicity-minded adversaries understood themselves to have more legiti-
mate authority than a few hecklers nostalgically trotting out rational de-
bate. On Habermas’s reading, we have been returned to a public sphere, 
and to a mindset, in which Hobbes’s proclamation in Leviathan holds sway: 
Auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem.8 Authority, now managed through public-
ity and advertising, not truth, makes the law. 
Notes
1. Hegel’s discussion of civil society and the state appears in section 3, entitled “Ethical Life,” 
in his Philosophy of Right (1942).
2. Habermas “provides a brilliant and fundamentally important metaframework for librarian-
ship” (Buschman, 2003, p. vii).
3. Some have criticized Habermas’s analysis as idealistic or romantic by virtue of its focus 
on bourgeois public life and it commensurate underestimation of the significance of 
“alternative,” plebeian, or marginal collective realms that were equally rational-critical. 
In short, Habermas’s account is seen as gender-, race-, and class-blind. Habermas’s thesis 
also underplays the repressive side of bourgeois public life in terms of the overbearing 
“gaze” of the expert-professional. E.g., see Susen (2011, pp. 51–56).
4. “Ten years earlier Marx had his eye on the perspective of this development: to the extent 
that non-bourgeois strata penetrated the public sphere in the political realm and took 
possession of its institutions, participated in press, parties, and Parliament, the weapons 
of publicity forged by the bourgeoisie were pointed against it itself” (Habermas, 1991, 
p. 126).
5. See, especially, Rockwell (1943).
6. The economic paradigm assaulting traditional enlightenment values is Hegel’s (merely) 
“civil society”—society grounded in the formalism of economic contracts. This becomes 
denigrated to the level of the “subjective opining of the many” (Habermas, 1991, p. 119).
7. For the effects of the economic paradigm, especially on our understanding of work, see 
Pieper (1948).
8. Habermas (1991, p. 53), quoting Hobbes: “The interpretation of the laws of nature in a 
Commonwealth dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writ-
ers, without the authority of the Commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be they 
never so true,” from Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), part 2, chapter 26. The more imposing, 
Latin version of this quote comes from the translation of Leviathan in Opera philosophica 
quae latine scripsi omnia (Hobbes, 1841, chapter XXVI, p. 202). 
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